This study investigates the effectiveness of ambient charges under non-point source (NPS) pollutions in an imperfect competition framework. To this end, following Ganguli and Raju [1], it constructs a one-stage game and a two-stage game in which Bertrand duopolistic firms choose their best prices and abatement technology, respectively. It is demonstrated in both games that an increase in the ambient charge can lead to a decrease in pollution. This finding indicates that the ambient charge can efficiently control pollution in a Bertrand duopoly.
Introduction
It is now well-known that most of today's pollutions such as air pollution, river pollution and lake pollution have multiple sources although any pollution originates from a single point source. It is, however, not known how to control these NPS (non-point source) pollutions. Segarson [2] suggests an ambient charge control: the government adopts an environmental policy to establish a cut-off level of the whole pollution and make the following rule, regardless of each firm's specific emission level, if the actual level of the total level exceeds the cut-off level, then all firms levy the same penalty while if the actual level falls short of the cut-off level, the all firms are awarded the same subsidy. The main purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the ambient charges can control the Theoretical Economics Letters total amount of NPS pollutions under ála Bertrand imperfect competition. Based on the analysis of Raju and Ganguli [3] in a Cournot duopoly setting, Matsumoto et al. [4] show a "good-natured" effect of ambient charges in an N-firm Cournot framework that an increase in the ambient charge leads to decreases of the total level of industry pollutions. On the other hand, Ganguli and Raju [1] consider the same subject in a Bertrand duopolistic market and numerically exhibit a "perverse" effect that an increase of ambient charge may lead to an increase in pollution in two distinct settings, one in the one-stage game and the other in the two-stage game. Ishikawa et al. [5] consider an ambient charge effect in an N-firm Bertrand framework. This study shows the good-natured effect of ambient charges in Bertrand duopoly, analytically in one-stage game and numerically in two-stage game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the optimal price strategies of Bertrand duopolistic firms are derived in one-stage game in which all actions take place simultaneously. In Section 3, the optimal choices of abatement technology at the first stage and prices at the second stage are considered in two-stage game in which the actions take place in sequence. Concluding remarks and further extension of this study are given in Section 4.
One-Stage Game
In this section we consider the effect of the ambient charge in one stage game in which the regulator has announced the ambient charge and a cut-off ambient standard while two firms have fixed their pollution abatement technologies.
Under this circumstance the firms choose their optimal prices to maximize their profits. Each firm produces a differentiated product. Market demand function
where i q denotes good i produced by firm i , i p is the price of i q , j p is the price for the good j and γ is a parameter with 0 1 γ < < measuring the substitutability between two goods. 1 We exclude two extreme cases, one with 1 γ = where the two goods are homogenous and the other with 0 γ = where they are independent. The total amount of pollution E generated by the two firms is given by 
a p p p c t dp
Maximizing j π with respect to j p presents a similar first-oder condition for firm j. Hence solving the following simultaneous system, which is obtained from first order conditions for firms i and j,
yields the Bertrand equilibrium prices,
that are, after arranging the terms, (
Concerning the positivity of the Bertrand price, we have the following results. 
.
The inequality implies that 0
Differentiating the Bertrand price of firm i with respect to t reveals that the sign of the derivative is the same as the sign of the terms in the square brackets
Hence the effect caused by a change in the ambient charge on the Bertrand prices can summarized as follows.
Theorem 2 A firm with a larger or equal abatement technology positively responds to a change in the ambient charge whereas the response of a firm with a smaller abatement technology is ambiguous, j dp dp dt dt dp dp dt dt dp dp dt dt
and for firm j, from the bracketed terms in the second equation of (5) to be equal to zero, we can define the ratio of the abatement technologies
This ratio is less than unity implying 0 according to when 1.
The same procedure can be applied for the case of j i j i dp dq dp dt dt dt dq dp dp dt dt dt
Concerning the ambient charge effect on output, we have the following results.
Theorem 4 A firm with a larger or equal abatement technology negatively responds to a change in the ambient charge whereas the response of a firm with a smaller abatement technology is ambiguous: 
Two-Stage Game
In this section the firms and the regulator take actions in two stages. At the first stage, each firm determines its optimal abatement technology whereas the regulator announces the ambient charge and the cut-off level of total pollution. Then at the second stage, the firms choose their prices to maximize their profits, given the ambient charge, the cut-of level and their abatement technologies.
The decision-making at the second stage have been already considered in the one-stage game. Given the Bertrand prices and outputs in (5) and (6), we consider the actions of choosing abatement technology at the first stage. The Bertrand profit function of firm i under Bertrand prices and Bertrand output is defined as
for , 1, 2 i j = and i j ≠ . Notice that there is a small difference between the definitions of (3) and (11). There is a term ( ) 
Solving (12) and (13) 
Although the form of the solution seems to be highly complicated, the following result is obtained. Proof. It is numerically confirmed that the denominator of (14) is negative for 0 1 γ < < and 0 1 t ≤ ≤ . 3 The numerator is rewritten as
where ambiguous in the shaded region of Figure 2 (b). However, Figure 3 implies that the elasticity of φ * in absolute value is larger than that of q * , leading to the negative sign of dE dt * . Therefore we have our main result that an increase in ambient charge always decreases the total level of optimal pollution. 5 We summarize this result.
Proposition 4 It is numerically confirmed that a change in the ambient charge has the good-natured effect, 
Concluding Remark
In this paper, we reconsider the "perverse" effect caused by a change in ambient charges shown by Ganguli and Raju [1] . To this end, following their basic framework, we first re-examine the effect in one-stage game in which the Bertrand firms determine their prices so as to maximize their profits, given the abatement technology. Our first result analytically demonstrates that an increase of ambient charges decreases the total level of NPS pollutions. We then turn attention to the effect in two-stage game in which the optimal abatement technology is selected at the first stage and the optimal prices are determined at the second stage. Our second result numerically shows the good-natured effect on the total level of pollution. With these results, we conclude that the ambient charge might be an efficient method to control NPS pollutions even in a duopoly Bertrand market. 5 We obtain this results with various values of a and c . However, we are unable to prove it analytically so this is an numerically-shown result.
